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Implications of FTC v. Actavis: A
Reasonable Approach to Evaluating
Reverse Payment Settlements
Diane E. Bieri*
The Court’s opinion in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.1 resolves the
important threshold question of the appropriate legal lens
through which to evaluate patent settlements where
consideration flows from an innovator drug company to its
generic challenger.2 The Court rejected both the “presumption
of illegality” advocated by the FTC and the so-called “scope of
the patent” test favored by the drug manufacturer defendants,
holding instead that agreements should be analyzed under the
rule of reason.3 Thus, reverse payment patent settlements will
be evaluated on a case by case basis, considering factors
including “[the payment’s] size, its scale in relation to the
payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence
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1. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
2. Settlements where the innovator drug company provides money or
something else of value to the generic company have been referred to by
various names, e.g., “reverse payments,” “pay-for-delay,” “exclusion
payments.” The terms “pay-for-delay” and “exclusion payments”
mischaracterize settlements that have brought generic products to market
months or years before patent expiration. Likewise, the term “reverse
payment” is imprecise to the extent it implies that these settlements somehow
stand apart from the norm, as consideration flowing from the innovator to the
alleged infringer is a typical dynamic in settlements. See Asahi Glass Co. v.
Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (Posner, J.)
(“[A]ny settlement agreement can be characterized as involving ‘compensation’
to the defendant, who would not settle unless he had something to show for
the settlement.”). Yet, the Court adopted the “reverse payment settlements”
terminology in Actavis, and for ease of reference, I will do the same
throughout this Article.
3. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–31, 2237–38.
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from other services for which it might represent payment, and
the lack of any other convincing justification.”4
In rejecting the scope of the patent test, the Court noted
that “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in
determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and
consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a
patent.”5 Yet even as it acknowledged the relevance of patent
law, the Court asserted that a “large” payment by the
innovator to the generic company could signify a weak patent.6
This dicta seems to reflect some lack of appreciation for the
Hatch-Waxman statutory framework and the litigation and
settlement dynamics it has spawned. Similarly, the Court
discussed only in cursory fashion, and ultimately deferred to
the district courts, the question of the role that patent validity
should play in determining the reasonableness of the
settlement.7 That question likely will remain a controversial
point in an ongoing debate concerning the legitimacy of reverse
payment settlements, and how it is resolved will shape the
impact that Actavis ultimately will have on innovation within
and beyond the pharmaceutical industry.
I. THE COURT’S DECISION CLARIFIES THE LEGAL
STANDARD APPLICABLE TO REVERSE PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS AND SHOULD PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY
FOR COMPANIES AND COURTS
First and foremost, Actavis brings clarity to the antitrust
treatment
of
Hatch-Waxman
settlements
involving
consideration flowing from innovator companies to generic
competitors.8 Prior to the Court’s decision, several circuit
courts of appeal had split on the issue of the appropriate lens
through which to evaluate these agreements.9
Three courts of appeals—the Eleventh Circuit,10 the
Second Circuit,11 and the Federal Circuit12—had adopted a

4. Id. at 2237.
5. Id. at 2231.
6. Id. at 2236.
7. Id. at 2236–37.
8. Id. at 2231, 2237–38.
9. Id. at 2230.
10. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012),
rev’d sub nom. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).

2014]

IMPLICATIONS OF FTC V. ACTAVIS

137

“scope of the patent” approach in the context of antitrust
challenges to reverse payment settlements. Under the scope of
the patent analysis, a settlement that fell within the
exclusionary potential of the patent would essentially be
immune from antitrust attack unless the patent was obtained
by fraud or the underlying litigation was a sham.13 This
approach focused on the need to give full effect to the
exclusionary power of a presumptively valid patent. It also
placed a high value on resolving disputes through settlement
versus protracted litigation.14
In contrast, the Third Circuit had held that settlements
containing a transfer of value from the innovator company to
the generic were presumptively illegal and that courts
reviewing such agreements should proceed under a “quick look”
approach.15 The “quick look” approach effectively mimics a
statutory presumption of illegality. It rests on the premise that,
barring convincing evidence from defendants of the
procompetitive effects of the settlement agreement, all so-called
reverse payment settlements should be found to violate the
antitrust law.16
In Actavis, the Court rejected both the scope of the patent
and the “quick look” approaches and opted instead for the more
conventional rule of reason analysis.17 The rule of reason, the
Court explained, strikes the proper balance between the goals
of the patent system and those of the antitrust laws.18 Under
the rule of reason approach, courts weigh a multitude of factors
including “likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues,
market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations

11. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litg., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d
Cir. 2006).
12. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litg., 544 F.3d 1323,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
13. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (citing Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312 and
describing the Second Circuit and Federal Circuit approaches as “similar”).
14. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“There is no question that settlements provide a number of private
and social benefits as opposed to the inveterate and costly effects of
litigation.”).
15. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214–18 (3d Cir. 2012).
16. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
17. Id. at 2230–31, 2237–38.
18. Id. at 2231 (citing United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287,
308 (1948)).
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present in the circumstances,”19 as well as specific industry
context.20
Significantly, the Court unanimously rejected the
presumption of illegality standard proposed by the FTC.21
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer concluded that socalled reverse payment patent settlements are too complex to
meet the criterion for applying a presumptive rule.22 Thus, the
Court held that a presumption of illegality is not appropriate
and the FTC must prove its case as in traditional rule of reason
cases.23 The dissenting Justices would have adopted the scope
of the patent approach but joined the majority in inexorably, if
implicitly, rejecting the FTC’s proposed presumption of
illegality standard.24
In its preference for traditional rule of reason analysis,
Actavis is consistent with the Court’s precedent that conduct
may be condemned using a “quick look” presumption of
illegality only when “an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect
on customers and markets.”25 In California Dental, the Court
held that “quick look” treatment was inappropriate because the
challenged restrictions “might plausibly be thought to have a
net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on
competition.”26
Likewise, there is no basis to believe that settlements that
include consideration flowing from the innovator to the generic
company inevitably have an anticompetitive effect. The Court
recognized this explicitly, noting that “offsetting or redeeming
virtues are sometimes present” in reverse payment
settlements; for example, the payment may reflect avoided
litigation costs or “compensation for other services that the
19. Id. at 2231.
20. Id. at 2237.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2243 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Our cases establish that
antitrust law has no business prying into a patent settlement so long as that
settlement confers to the patent holder no monopoly power beyond what the
patent conferred—unless, of course, the patent was invalid, but that . . . is a
question of patent law, not antitrust law.”).
25. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
26. Id. at 771.
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generic has promised to perform—such as distributing the
patented item or helping to develop a market for that item.”27
Ultimately, by refusing to draw any bright lines in favor of or
against these types of settlements, the Court determined that,
as with most antitrust cases, lower courts should have the
flexibility to review the details and likely consequences of the
agreements on a case by case basis.28 The rule of reason
analysis allows trial courts to “structure antitrust litigation so
as to avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust theories too
abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the other,
consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the
minimal light it may shed . . . .”29
II. THE COURT’S PERCEPTION THAT THE SIZE OF THE
REVERSE PAYMENT MAY SERVE AS A PROXY FOR THE
STRENGTH OF THE PATENT FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR
THE DYNAMICS OF HATCH-WAXMAN LITIGATION
In defending the administrability of a rule of reason
standard in the context of reverse payment settlements, the
Court stated that “the size of the unexplained reverse payment
can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all
without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the
validity of the patent itself.”30 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court did not appear to take into account either the unique
structure and incentives associated with the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (better
known as “the Hatch-Waxman Act”)31 or the way that those
elements drive Hatch-Waxman litigation.
The Hatch-Waxman Act granted certain intellectual
property protections to innovators to preserve incentives for
innovation, and at the same time, created a pathway for and
incentives to bring generic drugs to market.32 The Act allows

27. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2238.
30. Id. at 2236–37.
31. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.).
32. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669–71
(1990) (explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Act had dual goals of restoring to
innovators the patent protection lost during the regulatory approval process
and allowing competing generic companies to conduct, during the patent term,
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generic drug makers to obtain regulatory approval to market
generic drugs using a radically less expensive and faster
process than that required of innovator drug companies,
wherein the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)
essentially piggy-backs on the innovator’s new drug application
(NDA).33 In contrast to the huge sums spent on bringing an
innovator drug to market, the cost of preparing and filing an
ANDA is about $1 million.34 Firms pursuing this approach
must show only that their generic product has the same active
ingredients and is bioequivalent to a reference drug that
previously has been approved.35 Further, a company can seek
approval from the FDA to market the generic drug before the
expiration of a patent relating to the innovator drug by
certifying that the patent in question is invalid or not infringed
by the generic product (a “Paragraph IV certification”).36 The
Hatch-Waxman Act also grants 180 days of marketing
exclusivity to the first generic company (or companies) to
challenge an innovator’s patents and gain FDA approval for its
product.37
From the standpoint of the generic company, one of the
most attractive features of the Hatch-Waxman Act is the
ability to initiate a challenge to the patent without incurring
any liability in doing so. The Act includes a provision that
allows companies to develop information to submit to the FDA
without these activities constituting patent infringement.38
Filing a Paragraph IV certification, in and of itself, constitutes
an act of patent infringement that enables the innovator to
bring a patent infringement suit.39 The generic challenger is
not required to bring products to market as a prerequisite to
the challenge, and therefore, the patent holder does not sustain

otherwise infringing activity necessary to gain regulatory approval); Emily
Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 260–
64 (2012).
33. See, e.g.,Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296–
98 (11th Cir. 2003) (summarizing Hatch-Waxman Act provisions).
34. Morris, supra note 32, at 262.
35. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059 n.2 (11th
Cir. 2005) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012).
37. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
39. Id. § 271(e)(2)(A).
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any damages.40 Thus, the generic drug company’s chief risks in
challenging a patent typically are confined to the legal fees and
FDA filing expenses that it may not recover (or may recover
only after patent expiration) if it loses the litigation.
Ultimately, this combination of factors in the HatchWaxman Act creates significant incentives for generic drug
companies to challenge patents even where the patent holder is
highly likely to prevail in court. The result of these skewed
incentives under the Hatch-Waxman framework is striking. In
its study of authorized generic drugs, the Federal Trade
Commission stated that “for a drug with [annual] brand sales
of $130 million, a generic that does not anticipate [authorized
generic] competition will expect a patent challenge to be
profitable if it has at least a 4 percent chance of winning . . . .”41
But even this statistic vastly understates the magnitude of
generic drug companies’ skewed incentives. Most innovator
drugs have annual sales well over $130 million. According to
one analysis, for almost 90% of innovator drug sales (measured
in dollars), a first-filing generic challenger balancing upside
gain under Hatch-Waxman against downside risk limited to
litigation costs can justify filing a Paragraph IV certification if
it believes it has a 3% chance of success in a patent case.42
When a drug with significant sales is involved, it is
economically rational for a generic company to challenge the
patent even if there is virtually no reason to think that the
patent is infirm.43 Statistics regarding the number of

40. See Gerald Sobel, Consideration of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases
Challenging Hatch-Waxman Act Settlements, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 47, 51 (2010)
(“Unlike the usual patent case, there are ordinarily no damages claims against
the generic because Hatch-Waxman forces the litigation to occur in the period
prior to marketing by the generic. As a result, no sales or profits are lost by
the patentee to the generic. While patent infringement suits are often settled
by compromise of a damages claim, that vehicle is typically not available in
Hatch-Waxman cases.” (footnotes omitted)).
41. FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONGTERM IMPACT, at iii n.7 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/
2011genericdrugreport.pdf.
42. Kelly Smith & Jonathan Gleklen, Generic Drugmakers Will Challenge
Patents Even When They Have a 97% Chance of Losing: The FTC Report that
K-Dur Ignored, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2012, at 2.
43. See Morris, supra note 32, at 269 (“In effect, the Hatch-Waxman Act
actually makes pharmaceutical patents weaker than any other type of patent
by making challenges to pharmaceutical patents easier and more attractive
than for any other type of patent.”).
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Paragraph IV certifications prove this point. According to
research by Duke University economist Henry Grabowski and
colleagues, 64% of innovative medicines faced a Paragraph IV
patent challenge in 2008, up from just 9% in 1995.44 Moreover,
given the incentives to challenge patents, it is not unusual for
drugs to attract multiple generic challengers.45 While one could
argue that the proliferation of patent challenges is nothing
more than an intended consequence of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
there is evidence that these challenges also have produced
unintended negative impacts on innovation and the value of
patents.46
Needless to say, the Hatch-Waxman litigation dynamics,
which the Court in Actavis did not address, create significant
challenges for innovator companies. Companies with extensive
product portfolios must somehow manage the risks inherent in
multiple challenges, many of which subject their most
successful patents to the vagaries of litigation. The threats may
be even greater for smaller pharmaceutical companies, “whose
entire market value rests on protecting the patent rights that
support a handful of products.”47 For these companies, “the
uncertainty of litigation can be untenable—even when the
company has no doubt about the validity, scope, and term of its
patents.”48 Under these circumstances, it should not be
surprising—nor should it be seen as an admission of weak
44. Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand-Name and Generic Drug
Competition May Warrant a Revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30 HEALTH
AFF. 2157, 2161 (2011).
45. See Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements
in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 377 (2010);
Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust
Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 520–21 (2007)
(“Highly profitable drugs with tremendous therapeutic utility should and do
generally attract multiple generic challengers.”); see also Smith & Gleklen,
supra note 42 (showing FTC data on incentives for generic firms that do not
enjoy the benefit of 180-day exclusivity).
46. At least one study suggests that Paragraph IV challenges by generic
manufacturers have shortened effective patent lives by at least 1.5 years, and
that this held true regardless of whether the challenges were successful.
Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market
Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
491, 501 (2007).
47. CHARLES-ANDRÉ BROUWERS ET AL., BOS. CONSULTING GRP.,
EMERGING BIOPHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES: ENSURING A FAVORABLE
ENVIRONMENT FOR CONTINUED INNOVATION 12 (2011).
48. Id.
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patents—that many pharmaceutical innovators quite
reasonably choose to settle some Hatch-Waxman challenges,
even on terms that include providing considerable value to a
generic competitor.49
The complex nature of reverse payment settlements
themselves further calls into question whether the size of the
payment could fairly be used as a proxy for patent strength.
The Court in Actavis posits a scenario where an innovator
earns $50 million profits per year for its product, with ten more
years remaining on the patent.50 The Court points out that a
verdict that the patent is invalid or not infringed would cost the
patentee $500 million.51 The Court then contemplates a
settlement that includes an unspecified payment to the generic
and an unspecified generic entry date that ultimately “keeps
prices at patentee-set levels, potentially producing the full
patent-related $500 million monopoly return while dividing
that return between the challenged patentee and the patent
challenger.”52 But this hypothetical only makes sense if the
settlement provides that the generic enters the market at a
date that is very close to patent expiration; that is the only way
that the innovator could realize the full $500 million in profits.
In reality, settlements often permit generic entry substantially
before patent expiration.53 Further, the so-called reverse

49. Both within and outside of the Hatch-Waxman context, settlement is
by far the most common method of resolving a patent dispute. See Marc G.
Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements & the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1048 (2004) (finding that across all patent cases, 95%
are resolved by settlement).
50. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2234–35.
53. See, e.g., id. at 2229 (describing Solvay’s settlement with generic
companies Actavis, Par, and Paddock, where generics obtained licenses to
market their products beginning August 31, 2015, sixty-five months before
Solvay’s patent expired); Brief for the Generic Pharmaceutical Association as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 769341 (describing the settlement that
provided for entry of generic Lipitor five years before patent expiration, at
projected consumer savings of billions of dollars per year); Brief of Generic
Manufacturers Upsher-Smith Laboratories et al., as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 23–24, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013)
(No. 12-416), 2013 WL 769339 (describing a settlement wherein one generic
version of tamoxifen came to market nine years before patent expiration,
while three generic companies subsequently litigated and lost patent
challenges on the same drug).
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payments incorporated into settlements often relate to
ancillary agreements for products or services to be provided by
the generic, in contrast to the Court’s hypothetical naked
payment for staying off the market.54 As the Court later
acknowledged, district courts must view any “payment” from
the innovator to the generic in context, taking into account all
elements of the settlement in order to assess the
reasonableness of the agreement.55
III. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE PATENT’S STRENGTH
ARE LIKELY TO BE CRITICAL TO EVALUATING THE
REASONABLENESS OF A REVERSE
PAYMENT SETTLEMENT
The Court’s statements about the size of the reverse
payment and its relationship to patent strength may be read as
an indication that the FTC could prove its prima facie case—at
least in certain circumstances—without submitting evidence
regarding the validity of the patent. However, the Court also
noted that when evaluating the reasonableness of a settlement,
“‘the quality of proof required should vary with the
circumstances.’”56 There is nothing in the Court’s opinion that
prohibits an antitrust defendant from arguing that a reverse
payment did not harm competition because it secured a
settlement that included early entry for the generic, in contrast
to the likely alternative outcome where the innovator would
have won the underlying patent litigation and prevented
generic entry until patent expiration.

54. See, e.g., Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (noting that companies’
settlement agreements described payments “as compensation for other
services the generics promised to perform . . . .”); Holman, supra note 45, at
498 (“In many cases the ‘payment’ comes in the form of a side deal, i.e., an
agreement ancillary to the patent settlement.”).
55. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (noting that complexities inherent in
reverse payment settlements support the conclusion that “the FTC must prove
its case as in other rule-of-reason cases”).
56. Id. at 2237–38 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780
(1999)); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 885 (2007) (under the rule of reason, “the factfinder weighs all of the
circumstances of a case” including “specific information about the relevant
business and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
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This is not a far-fetched or hypothetical argument of the
sort that would shed only “minimal light”57 on the competitive
nature of a reverse payment settlement. Patent holders often
prevail in Hatch-Waxman litigation that proceeds to final
judgment. Statistics show that for the 171 Paragraph IV cases
litigated to court decisions between 2000 and 2009, innovator
companies prevailed in 52% of them.58 More recent data on
cases decided between 2009 and 2012 support these findings,59
and in 2012 alone, innovator companies won 72% of HatchWaxman cases.60 Even the outdated and skewed figures
provided in the FTC’s 2002 report relied upon by reverse
payment critics pegged the innovator’s rate of success at a nontrivial 27.5%.61
Beyond these aggregate numbers, cases reveal concrete
examples of pharmaceutical patent owners that settled with
some generics with arrangements that have been characterized
as reverse payments and early entry and subsequently litigated
with other generics and prevailed, keeping these later
infringers off the market. For example, after the settlement at
issue in the Eastern District of New York’s In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation case, the patent was
repeatedly upheld as valid in other Hatch-Waxman litigation,
meaning that absent the settlement, there likely would have

57. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (stating that courts applying rule of reason
may avoid “consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the
minimal light it may shed on the basic question—that of the presence of
significant unjustified anticompetitive consequences”).
58. See RBC CAPITAL MKTS. CORP., PHARMACEUTICALS: ANALYZING
LITIGATION SUCCESS RATES 4 (2010).
59. Gregory Glass, Legal Defenses and Outcomes in Paragraph IV
Litigation, 10 J. GENERIC MEDS. 4 (2013) (finding that innovator companies
won 54% of Paragraph IV cases litigated to court decisions between 2009 and
2012).
60. PWC, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: BIG CASES MAKE HEADLINES
WHILE
PATENT
CASES
PROLIFERATE
28
(2013),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013patent-litigation-study.pdf.
61. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY 19–20 (2002) (finding that, of court decisions in litigation involving
forty drug products from 1992–2000, the innovator prevailed against the
generic company in litigation involving eleven drug products). See Brief of
Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26–27,
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 836946, for
a discussion of the flaws in predicting modern litigation outcomes based on the
FTC’s 2002 report.

146

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:1

been no early entry by any generic at all.62 The same outcome
occurred after the settlements at issue in In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litigation63 were reached, and the patent was
repeatedly upheld as valid.64 Similarly, after state attorneys
general blocked a so-called “reverse payment” settlement
between Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) and Apotex involving the
drug Plavix, BMS won its patent case at trial.65
These examples demonstrate that settlements with
consideration flowing from an innovator company to a generic
firm may have procompetitive effects by permitting early
generic entry that would not have otherwise occurred. This is
not to say that all reverse payment patent settlements should
survive antitrust scrutiny, nor that the Court necessarily erred
in adopting a rule of reason approach over the more deferential
scope of the patent test. Nevertheless, any approach that lower
courts develop in evaluating reverse payment settlements
under the rule of reason should be sufficiently expansive to
allow defendants to prove that, in the absence of the payment,
the innovator would have prevailed (after years of costly,
burdensome patent litigation), and generic entry would have
been delayed until patent expiration. In other words, courts
should recognize that evaluating evidence pertaining to the
strength of the underlying patent may be the only means of
ensuring that consumers continue to reap the benefits of these
procompetitive reverse payment agreements.
As the Court acknowledged in Actavis, albeit in passing,
there remains “a general legal policy favoring the settlement of
disputes.”66 The Court downplayed the likely impact of its
ruling on this policy, stating without support that “the fact that

62. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d
514, 519–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (summarizing results of litigation where Bayer
defeated two generic companies’ validity challenges on summary judgment
and overcame another generic’s validity challenge after a nine-day bench
trial).
63. 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
64. See Zeneca Ltd. v. Novopharm Ltd., No. 96-1364, 1997 WL 168318
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 10, 1997); Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., No. CIV.A.9612413-RCL, 2000 WL 34335805 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2000).
65. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); see also Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 317, 323–34
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing the parties’ proposed patent settlements and the
government’s responses to same).
66. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013).
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a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability
does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit.
They may, as in other industries, settle in other ways . . . .”67
The FTC has likewise argued that an alternative settlement
may be reached in lieu of reverse payment agreements.68 But
experts familiar with economics and the dynamics of HatchWaxman litigation argue that, in at least some cases, the
parties may be unlikely to reach a settlement in the absence of
some consideration flowing from the innovator to the generic,69
and neither the Court nor the FTC have rebutted these
statements. In fact, the FTC admits—and seems pleased by the
prospect—that some cases that may have settled with reverse
payments would proceed to litigation if reverse payments are
not readily available.70 But neither the Court nor the FTC have
explained why the law should favor an alternative resolution,
be it another settlement or patent litigation, over a
procompetitive reverse payment agreement.71 Moreover,
arguments that the parties could have reached an alternative
settlement and arguments that the parties would instead have
pursued Hatch-Waxman litigation to a likely innovator victory
are essentially different sides of the same coin—if the former is
relevant to the competitive effects analysis, it is hard to fathom
how the latter is not equally relevant.

67. Id. at 2237.
68. Brief for the Petitioner at 39–40, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223
(2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 267027 [hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner].
69. Dickey et al., supra note 45, at 391–97; Kent S. Bernard & Willard K.
Tom, Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Need for
Context and Fidelity to First Principles, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 617, 618–19, 628–31
(2005); see also Brief of Mediation and Negotiation Professionals as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 11, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223
(2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 838156 (“Modern negotiating theory and
practice confirm that single variable negotiation [e.g., limiting parties’
discussion to the issue of the appropriate generic entry date] will be less likely
to produce settlement, and less likely to produce maximum settlement value,
than if the parties are allowed to trade multiple variables to advance their
differently valued interests.”).
70. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 68, at 40 (“But in the aggregate,
those judgments on the merits will reflect results more in keeping with the
policies of the antitrust laws, the Patent Act, and the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments than if all the cases had been settled with reverse payments.”).
71. As the Supreme Court noted in another context, courts are “ill-suited
to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other
terms of dealing.” Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, 555 U.S. 438, 452
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

148

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:1

In conclusion, the rule of reason approach contemplated in
Actavis can work to identify anticompetitive settlements
without condemning procompetitive agreements. But this
balance will be achieved only if courts resist the temptation to
focus on shortcuts such as the size of the reverse payment or on
the potential availability of alternative settlements, while
discounting evidence pertaining to the innovator’s patent and
the settlement as a whole that more accurately reflects the
competitive effects of the agreements. Indeed, such a
constrained application of the rule of reason would be little
better than the “presumption of illegality” the Court explicitly
rejected, insofar as it inevitably would penalize lawful patent
enforcement strategies and chill pro-consumer settlements.
Both the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act and fundamental
principles of patent and antitrust law dictate an approach that
recognizes that any agreement that allows, in the totality of the
circumstances, early entry by an infringer that would
otherwise be off the market for the life of the patent has a net
procompetitive effect, regardless of the presence—or size—of a
transfer of value from the patent holder to the infringer.

